This study provides empirical findings on determinants of mobile network operators' (MNO) choices of cross-border entry modes. Arguments mainly from transaction cost theory are used to derive hypotheses and research questions on factors explaining entry mode selection decisions between (1) minority versus majority equity share purchases, and (2) engagements in established operations versus greenfield start-ups. A sample of 111 announcements of strategic international expansion moves conducted by 27 mobile network operators and integrated telecom service corporations in the period from 1989 to 2004 is used to test the study hypotheses. Logistic regression analyses with two binary cross-border expansion mode choice variables as dependent criteria suggest that MNO internationalization entry mode choices were substantially influenced by cultural distance between home and host countries, country risk, demand potential, and competitive intensity in foreign markets. These country and market specific proxies for transaction cost and expansion risk driving factors are complemented by indicators of (1) the embeddedness of entry events into overall internationalization patterns of MNO and of (2) the MNO engagement timing in a foreign market. The latter is captured by entry rank and timing with regard to the closeness of the focal entry date to that of the launch date of the first digital commercial mobile service offer in a country market. Geographic proximity and economy size, as well as the control variables company size, foreign sales share, separate capital market listing, relative investment size, and actual completion of an announced expansion move did not significantly affect MNOs' choice of cross-border entry mode.
Introduction
Since the early 1990s telecommunications industry firms made numerous international expansion moves, especially into cellular mobile network markets of various countries.
Foreign entries of mobile network operators (MNO) varied regarding (1) equity share (i.e., minority vs. majority) and (2) degree to which new or existing assets were used (i.e., greenfield start-up or engagement in established operator). Further they displayed differences in terms of their timing features (e.g., pioneer vs. follower entries) that are interrelated to the two other entry mode characteristics just mentioned. Reviews of the large number of cross-sectional empirical studies on determinants of type of entry mode in a foreign country find that results do not provide a clear picture of such factors. They conclude that future studies should also take into account industry specific settings (Sarkar & Cavusgil 1996, pp. 844-845; Shimizu et al. 2004, pp. 311-324; Zhao et al. 2004, pp. 531-533) .
The heterogenous pattern of results may be taken to suggest that cross-border expansion moves depend on an array of target country, market and strategy characteristics that are also highlighted in transaction cost economics and in scholarly work on resource-and market-based explanations of a company's competitive advantage (cf. Chang & Rosenzweig 2001, pp. 748-753; Brouthers & Brouthers 2000, pp. 90-92; Hill et al. 1990, pp. 118-126; Somlev & Hoshino 2005, p. 579; Tihanyi et al. 2005, p. 272; Zhao et al. 2004, pp. 524-527) . Among others, a target country's cultural distance to the home country of the firm expanding abroad, its level of overall economic development, or the competitive intensity in the target country's national market entered by the regional diversifier, timing features, an expanding firm's size and international exposure may shape the mode choices of internationalizing firms.
Unfortunately, empirical studies incorporating a larger set of variables taken to reflect country-related transaction costs, firm characteristics and timing features to explain international entry mode differences are relatively scarce. In addition, most pertinent work draws on data covering an unspecified range of industries, which in most cases gravitates around manufacturing. However, telecommunications and the mobile services sector exhibit unique features that call for separate industry-focused analyses. There-fore, the present study contributes to the literature by exploring empirically a larger array of transaction cost and timing strategy explanations of two international expansion entry mode dimensions of MNO in the period from 1989 to 2004. Put differently, the present investigation's lead question is: Which target country and market characteristics that proxy transaction costs of international diversification and which timing features contribute significantly to the prediction of MNOs' cross-border entry mode choices?
The relevant MNO choices are structured along two dimensions that were taken into account only singularly or partially in previous studies (cf., Brouthers 2002, p. 210; Chang & Rosenzweig 2001, p. 748; Erramilli & Rao 1993, p. 27; Harzing 2002, p. 216; Hennart & Reddy 1997, p. 4; Somlev & Hoshino 2005, p . 587) (see Fig. 1 ): First, entry mode choices are distinguished according to the level of control achieved and commitment required by an MNO through obtaining a (a) minority or (b) majority equity share in a foreign investment. Second, the asset base or history of an entry differ depending on whether a local MNO is involved in the expansion move which is (a) already commercially present in a country (i.e., a participation in an established corporation) or (b) created anew as a start-up founded by an expanding MNO alone or in cooperation with various partners as a joint venture (i.e., greenfield). 
Factors explaining international entry mode choices 2.1 Target country and market characteristics
Transaction costs that an MNO has to bear when entering a foreign market are related to the characteristics of the target country and market. 1 In this particular setting, transaction costs refer to any efforts required by an MNO to find and to negotiate cross-border entry opportunities and to monitor the implementation of foreign direct investment plans (cf. Brouthers 2002, p. 204; Erramilli & Rao 1993, p. 21; Williamson 1985, pp. 18-23) . Such efforts are usually not measured directly but rather through variables that are assumed to reflect either transaction cost increases or reductions. Interpreted with a transaction cost lens, the concepts of spatial and psychological distances between home and target country (Eden & Miller 2004, pp. 187-213; Ghemawat 2001, p. 140; Xu & Shenkar 2002, pp. 608-614; Luostarinen 1979, pp. 128-143) , which are often mirrored in target country peculiarities, are at the core of transaction cost related mode choice explanations (cf., Hill et al. 1990, pp. 122-123) . Therefore, geographic proximity and cultural distance of a country targeted in an international expansion step as well as target country business risk, general demand-side economic attractiveness, mobile subscriber growth potential, and intensity of competition in the mobile communications market are country-level characteristics that potentially impact the required search, bargaining, and control efforts associated with MNO international expansion moves.
Geographic proximity between a firm's expansion target market and its home country influences management efforts associated with the entry phase and with the actual cross-border operations. Examples of proximity cost impacts are travel time, frequency, and efforts caused by communication difficulties due to time shifts between working hours. Specifically in the telecommunications industry, the expansion of operations into regions which directly border to each other is assessed as being beneficial: The number of telecommunication connections between service subscribers in neighboring countries is larger than between distant countries, which makes it easier for an MNO present in 1 The present paper does not focus on characteristics of the internationalizing firm and on the size of a transaction as factors that may be suited to explain MNO entry mode choices. However, a number of such variables are included as controls in the multivariate analyses. See also Sarkar & Cavusgil 1996, p. 833; Hoffmann & Schaper-Rinkel 2001, pp. 140-141. both neighboring countries to attract new customers via special international "on-net" tariffs and to generate additional cross-border traffic revenues (Clegg & Kamall 1998, p. 65 ). While geographic proximity may contribute to operational efficiency of foreign operations, potential effects of this entry characteristic on mode decisions are an open research question. It can only be speculated that a lower burden associated with geographically less distant entries makes (1) majority investments in (2) newly founded ventures more likely. Therefore, we address this factor in an exploratory spirit by raising research questions R 1 and R 2 . R 1 : Does geographic proximity make international MNO majority investments significantly more likely than minority engagements? (Hanvanich et al. 2003, pp. 4-6; Markides & Ittner 1994, p. 348; Morosini et al. 1998, pp. 139-141) . 2 However, substantial cultural distance could also entail learning opportunities for managers and employees collaborating with foreign colleagues (Brock 2005, p. 270) . Overall, larger cultural differences should promote perceptions of the expanding firm's decision makers that idiosyncratic foreign local market knowledge is a key success factor and not readily available and that a simple transfer of home country marketing strategies is dysfunctional. Given these circumstances an expanding firm's decision makers may conclude to limit a foreign entry's risk level by sticking to minority investments in corporations that are already generating sales. This general reasoning should hold particularly for MNO since they are operating in an industry facing far reaching interventions from sector-specific national regulatory authorities and requiring substantial up-front capital expenditures. 2 Previous research reveals that national cultural distance and geographic distance are only moderately correlated (Harzing, 2004, p. 100 ). This leaves room for a treatment of geographic and national cultural distance as different antecedent variables of entry mode choices.
In fact, some studies indicate that higher cultural distance coincides with entry modes entailing minority investments together with partners instead of stand-alone approaches (e.g., Chang & Rosenzweig 2001, pp. 764-767; Erramilli & Rao 1993, p. 30) . However, the literature also provides evidence to the contrary: Cultural distance was found to favor greenfield stand-alone entry (Harzing 2002, p. 220) . Aggregate reviews of the topic are not conclusive (cf. Shimizu et al. 2004, pp. 311-322) . While one meta-analysis of 66 independent samples revealed no significant impact of cultural distance on entry mode choice (Tihanyi et al. 2005, pp. 276-278) , another meta-analysis of 15 studies claimed the opposite (Zhao et al. 2004, pp. 530-531) . Weighting the inconclusive empirical findings and specific mobile telco industry characteristics, we suggest to interpret large cultural differences as drivers of MNO strategies that focus on minority share participation in already existing operations in a country and that entail the risk-reducing equity involvement of other local or international partners in an investment. Put differently, we suggest as hypotheses H 1 and H 2 :
H 1 : Larger cultural distance makes international MNO minority engagements significantly more likely than majority investments.
H 2 : Larger cultural distance makes MNO foreign equity engagements in existing MNO significantly more likely than new venture entries.
Country risks in terms of the potential occurrence of nation-specific unfavorable economic and political conditions harming a firm's profitability and freedom of operations are general environmental circumstances that are typically used as evaluation criteria for any foreign direct investment strategy (Bradley 2005, pp. 125-128) . Being providers of infrastructure services, telecommunications network operators are particularly affected by target country risks (Doh & Teegen 2003, p. 46; Levy & Spiller 1996, p. 3 ). An MNO's transaction costs are higher in countries with higher country risks because they increase the necessity of additional monitoring efforts during the preparation, negotiation, and operations phase of foreign direct investments. To limit such transaction costs higher target country risk should lead to entry modes that entail cost sharing with partners. Therefore, (1) cross-border minority rather than majority investments and (2) takeovers of equity stakes in existing foreign MNO are more likely in cases with high target country risks at the time of an MNO's foreign market entry.
Cross-sectional evidence on entry mode effects of target country risk is largely in line with the above conjecture. While some non-significant results are reported in the literature (Erramilli & Rao 1993, p. 30) , most studies corroborate a significant relationship, favoring minority equity stakes and participation in existing operations as entry modes in high risk countries (Brouthers 2002, p. 213; Kim & Hwang 1992, pp. 47-49; Zhao et al. 2004, p. 530) . To sum, we propose as hypotheses H 3 and H 4 :
H 3 : Larger target country risks make international MNO minority engagements significantly more likely than majority investments. Such variables related to mobile services diffusion patterns are also relevant for MNO which try to contain transaction cost levels of market entry. First, target country markets with lower current mobile subscription penetration rates and lower competitive rivalry between the MNO present in these countries exhibit higher uncertainty with respect to the achievable penetration levels and competitive developments. These economic char-acteristics of a target country may be taken as factors that increase the risk potentials of those market entry variants requiring above average resource commitments and related control efforts. Second, search, negotiation and implementation costs are larger when the overall market size and the need for future mobile infrastructure expansion are large and competitive intensity is high. Third, large unmet demand coinciding with a low intensity of competition promotes new venture entry because additional suppliers have room for growth with limited threat to established players, making strong competitive retaliation less likely. Fourth, a higher concentration of market shares among a very small number of suppliers reduces the likelihood of finding a reasonably priced investment opportunity in an MNO already occupying a strong position in the focal country's market. Therefore, a lower competitive intensity diminishes the costs of greenfield entries relative to equity engagements in existing suppliers.
To sum, countries with larger economies, with higher unmet demand for mobile communication services and with lower competitive intensity make MNO entry via minority investments and via participation in new ventures more likely.
Market size and growth potential as well as competitive intensity were not given much attention as explanatory factors in previous entry mode choice investigations. Only industry concentration was found as being unable to predict entry mode choices (Chang & Rosenzweig 2001, p. 764; Hennart & Reddy 1997, p. 10) . Nevertheless, the preceding discussion leads to hypotheses H 5 and H 6 :
H 5 : Larger economy size and mobile demand growth potential and lower competitive intensity make international MNO minority engagements significantly more likely than majority investments.
H 6 : Larger economy size and mobile demand growth potential and lower competitive intensity make MNO foreign new venture entries significantly more likely than equity share purchases in existing MNO.
Timing characteristics
Timing-related circumstances of an international expansion move refer both to an MNO's position in the temporal order of competitor entries in a particular country and to the embeddedness of a particular entry into the overall time structure across a firm's international growth moves. With regard to entry timing in a particular country it is common practice to distinguish between the pioneer and follower options. The basic overall cross-move expansion entry patterns are the sprinkler (simultaneous entry in a larger number of markets) and the waterfall (gradual entry) approach (Bradley 2005, pp. 294-295; Homburg & Krohmer 2003, pp. 929-931; Kutschker & Bäurle 1997, pp. 117-121) . It is obvious that timing-related circumstances of an international expansion step are in part linked by definition to the two mode choice dimensions displayed in Fig. 1 .
To wit, a pioneer entry timing is more likely to coincide with the set-up of a greenfield venture than with an investment in an existing (fixed line) telco which may later choose to expand (as a pioneer) into the mobile communication market.
A sprinkler strategy of parallel entry in foreign markets incurs substantial transaction costs for MNO because numerous foreign markets not only have to be evaluated simultaneously but also coordinated in terms of infrastructure and handset procurement, network planning and deployment, international services, pricing schemes, and many other facets of entry preparation and operational roll-out. By limiting their engagements to (1) minority stakes in or partnering with (2) existing foreign MNO, internationalizing MNO can contain the transaction costs associated with a sprinkler strategy of international expansion.
Pioneer strategies in the international mobile industry are generally attributed to the holder of a second generation digital mobile network license who is the first in supplying mobile services to the business or residential customers in a country market. Pioneer strategies may embrace high transaction costs for MNO, which stem from the uncertain speed and scale of market adoption of services, uncertain technology standards, uncertain handset provision, high market opening efforts, and limited potential for infrastructure and distribution cooperations and alliances with other operators. From these considerations it follows that pioneering MNO can limit their transaction costs and business risks by establishing a pioneer position in a foreign country via (1) minority moves and (2) investments in existing (former state-owned monopolist) telco firms.
Due to the lack of previous empirical findings on timing and entry mode choice correlations, we posit the following exploratory research questions R 3 and R 4 : five years of the study period, i.e., from 12/1989 to 11/1994 (12/1999 to 12/2004 -12/1989 -11/1994 -12/1994 -11/1999 -12/1999 -12 
Variable measurements
Two binary variables were created to reflect the two entry mode choice dimensions and entered into the analyses as dependent variables. First, minority and majority stakes were coded: Equity stakes of less than 50% were assigned a value of 1 and stakes of at least 50% a value of 0 (see variable I in Fig. 3) . Second, new greenfield operations created by an MNO alone or in joint ventures with international and/or local partners were assigned a value of 1. A value of 0 was coded for all entries that took the form of an equity investment in an existing target MNO that already had a commercial market presence in the country (see variable II in Fig. 3) . Correlations between the two entry mode variables were significant but not extremely high (r = τ = 0.34; see Fig. 4 ).
Measures concerning the target country and market characteristics that were used as transaction cost proxies were obtained from four sources: (1) Fig. 3 ). 4 One approach to capture transaction costs is to measure country risk, mobile subscriber growth potential, intensity of competition and economy size in relative terms by calculating a home and host country difference score for each transaction. This approach was not used but rather the absolute values of these variables were retained for further analyses, since most MNO had their home country location in the USA or in European Union countries, which makes relative and absolute measures of these variables very similar. Hofstede 2001, p. 87, 151, 215, 286) using the formula suggested by Kogut & Singh (1988, p. 422 ). d) Variable 4 is the country risk index value for a target country published in Euromoney magazine in March or September prior to the event, with transposed values ranging from 0 (= lowest risk) to 100 (= highest risk). e) Data for variable 4 were collected from the annual Worldbank World Development Indicators publication containing the information for the event year. f) Variables 5-6 and C3 were computed from data found on the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), GSM Association, and country regulator websites as well as in the EMC and PriMetrica GlobalComms databases. g) Data for variables 7, C1-C2, and C5 were gathered from MNO annual reports covering the event year and previous periods. h) Variables 8 and 9 were coded with information collected from archival newspaper articles and news reports found in the LexisNexis database in combination with data on commercial network launches provided at the GSM Association web site. i) Variable C3 was computed from information found in newspaper articles and MNO annual reports. Fig. 3 ).
Country risk

Intensity of competition
Mobile subscriber growth potential
Finally, based on a review of previous entry mode choice and performance studies (e.g., Barkema & Bell, 1996 p. 163; Harzing 2002, p. 220; Hennart 1991, p. 489; Kallunki et al. 2001, pp. 366-367; Merchant & Schendel 2000, pp. 727-728; Ruigrok & Wagner 2003b, pp. 76-77; Zhao et al. 2004, pp. 532-537) and on data availability considerations, six characteristics of the expanding MNO firm and of the entry case were included as control variables. These were MNO size, international experience (measured via foreign mobile sales share), mobile business focus (measured by separate MNO stock market listing), foreign investment amount relative to an expanding firm's total market capitalization, MNO return on sales and consummation of the entry announcement (see variables C1-C6 in Fig. 3 ).
Statistical method
Binary logistic regression analysis was employed because of the dichotomous nature of dependent MNO entry mode choice dimensions. This multivariate method predicts the likelihood of alternative outcomes by simultaneously taking into account the explanatory and control variables (cf., Backhaus et al. 2006, pp. 426-461; Cohen et al. 2003, pp. 482-512) . Due to substantial collinearity of variable 9 and variables 5, 6 and C2 (see Fig. 4 ), two binary logistic regression analyses were computed for each of the two entry mode dimensions resulting in four calculation models (see Fig. 5 ): Models 1 and 3 include all variables except variable 9. Models 2 and 4 exclude variables 5, 6 and C2, while additionally taking variable 9 into account. The overall goodness of fit of the regressions and the findings pertaining to study variables are discussed in the next section.
Results and discussion
Six target country and market variables which could have an impact on an entry's transaction costs were examined as factors potentially influencing whether an entry involves a minority or majority engagement and whether it is scheduled as a new venture greenfield start-up or as equity share acquisition in an existing MNO. Explanatory power of the four regression models is satisfactory with chi-square values of the likeli-hood ratio test ranging from 43.07 to 53.28 (p < 0.001; Fig. 5 ). Nagelkerke R 2 s also indicate a reasonable overall fit of each of the four models with values between 0.44 and 0.52 which are not far away from the 0.5 threshold suggested in the literature as being indicative of a very good model fit (Backhaus et al. 2006, pp. 449-450) . Further the percentage of correct classifications ranges from 77.1 to 81.7. This is substantially higher than the correctly classified share obtained by assigning all cases to the larger group of the two subsamples derived from each of the two entry criteria (see classification improvement in Fig. 5 ).
Geographic proximity had no significant effect on the two entry mode criteria (see variable 1 in Fig. 5 ). Therefore, to answer research questions R 1 and R 2 , we do not detect (indirect) evidence for transaction cost changes of geographic distance per se that are related to MNO entry decisions. Thus, spatial distance is not a major concern for mobile network operators when deciding on their foreign entry mode.
Fig. 5: Logistic regression analyses explaining entry mode dimensions with target country, market, and timing variables
Cultural differences, measured with a cultural distance index based on Hofstede's four classic dimensions, significantly increased the propensity of MNO to choose minority investments for their cross-border market entry (see variable 2 in Fig. 5 ). The odds ratios indicate that minority engagements were significantly more likely by a factor of about 1.46 to 1.66 than majority investments. Entries by setting up a new venture instead of a participation in an existing MNO were not more common in situations with larger cultural differences between the home and target countries of an internationalizing MNO. These findings confirm H 1 but are counter to H 2 . Results are in line with Chang & Rosenzweig (2001, pp. 764-767) and Erramilli & Rao (1993, p. 30) , who also found shared control to be the preferred entry mode in cases of higher cultural uncertainty.
The country risk variable was associated with a lower propensity of minority investments and a lower likelihood of new venture entries (see variable 3 in Fig. 5 ). Contrary to H 3 but in line with H 4 , MNO tended to prefer risk mitigating equity participations in existing MNO compared to greenfield entries. Risks associated with infrastructure provision (cf. Doh & Teegen 2003, p. 46) seem to be more appropriately counterbalanced by drawing on already existing MNO assets in an ownership configuration where the foreign diversifier is clearly in control of the venture to prevent strategy execution delays stemming from inputs of other investors/local partners that already held an equity share in the focal target firm. This results pattern partially matches findings of Brouthers (2002, p. 213), Kim & Hwang (1992, pp. 47-49) , and Zhao et al. (2004, p. 530 ).
Next, we equated larger target economy size with higher transaction costs for expanding MNO. The non-significant economy size effects on both entry mode dimensions indicate that H 5 and H 6 received no support in our sample (see variable 4 in Fig. 5 ). The financial burden of acquiring very large foreign MNO or setting up a new MNO that has to cover a very large territory or population did not per se impose a transaction effort on expanding MNO that could only be reduced by taking over smaller equity shares and by trying to reduce these costs through the usage of assets of a firm already operating in a foreign market.
Larger mobile subscriber growth potentials, which are also indicative of lower mobile access subscription rates and of earlier market development stages at the country level, may lead to greater uncertainty about the best investment strategies to benefit from unmet customer demand. Results support this perspective both for the decision to enter via minority instead of majority equity share takeovers and for the decision to use a greenfield approach instead of investing in an established MNO in cases of higher market growth potential (see very high odds ratios for variable 5 in Fig. 5 ). These findings support H 5 and H 6 and can be attributed in part to peculiarities of mobile communication markets. Transaction cost differences of various entry modes go hand in hand with regulatory constraints, which in many cases prohibited majority investments of foreign firms in an existing MNO. The present findings show that minority investments in new ventures dominated cross-border entries in the early phase of mobile communication services adoption in various countries throughout the world.
Lower intensity of competition as indicated by a higher concentration of MNO shares in a national market, is also interpreted as a factor that affects transaction efforts which are required by a foreign entrant to ensure successful business operations in the focal target country. Supporting H 5 and H 6 , minority investments and new venture entries were preferred in countries with lower competitive intensity (see variable 6 in Fig. 5 ). Thus, in market entry mode considerations, the lower speed of mobile service diffusion and less predictable adoption cycle, which are associated with lower competitive rivalry lead to conclusions in line with results for the market growth potential variable. More concentrated markets also tend to be those which leave room for substantial growth due to unsatisfied customer demand (cf. correlation between variables 5 and 6 in Fig. 4) . The typical outcome of this assessment is that there is a market for a newly founded additional MNO and that some risk limitation is desirable by organizing the entry as a takeover of a minority share in a venture that is owned together with other (local) partners. Gerpott/Jakopin To address research questions 3 and 4, we looked at three timing variables accounting both for overall time-related entry patterns across countries and for country-specific entry ranks of MNO.
First, with regard to research question R 3 , we found that the overall entry pattern, i.e., the number of foreign investments surrounding the focal move, had no significant effect on the minority vs. majority entry mode dimension (see variable 7 in Fig. 5) . A lower intra-country entry rank, i.e., a strategy closer to or equal to the market pioneer in a country, was also not a substantial determinant of this first MNO entry mode dimension.
When MNO followed a strategy of entering a foreign market later, regardless of their entry rank, majority investments were more likely (see variables 8 and 9 in model 2 of Therefore, MNO that chose to expand more rapidly or in a larger number of countries simultaneously had no other option than to rely on new venture entry in many cases.
Further, equity share purchases in existing MNO were more likely than new ventures when MNO took a lower entry rank, i.e., joined the market relatively early (see variable 8 in Fig. 5 ). This finding is not in line with a market life cycle thinking according to which greenfield start-ups have better opportunities to prosper in early market development phases when there are no or few entrenched competitors. Contrary to this result, the elapse of a shorter time span between an MNO's entry date and that of the first commercial launch of a digital cellular network in the target country market was associated with a slightly higher propensity for investing in a new venture (see variable 9 in Fig. 5 ). Market entry barriers imposed by lower ranked entrants 5 may explain this result.
Overall, a lower entry rank that is not achieved by entering in the very early market development stages was accompanied by a preference for share purchases of telcos already operating in a country beforehand. Finally, this results pattern may be taken to imply that instead of simply looking at the dichotomy between pioneer vs. follower strategies, researchers and practitioners should examine both the entry rank and the entry time to appropriately determine a strategic position or timing effects.
From the set of six control variables, only the MNO return on sales had a consistently and substantially significant relation to one entry mode dimension: New venture entries were preferred by MNO with a higher return on sales (see variable C5 in Fig. 5 ). This
finding could indicate that more profitable MNO are also more confident that their management skills and financial muscles (which have already been proven in their above average return on sales) are sufficient to develop successfully a new venture abroad over a longer time period regardless of the formal foreign equity share held by an expanding MNO.
Overall, in the present mobile industry sample predictions regarding transaction costrelated entry mode antecedents were confirmed mostly for the equity share entry mode dimension. Hypotheses on factors explaining the choice to enter via a new venture or a participation in an existing MNO received somewhat less support.
Conclusions and limitations
This study set out to empirically explore the extent to which transaction cost related tar- The mobile industry exhibits substantial first mover advantages, which support higher market shares and better financial performance (Gerpott 2005, pp. 505-508; Knyphausen-Aufseß et al. 2002, pp. 214-222; Sung 2005, pp. 5-14; Rieck 2004, p. 8 ).
trast to majority -engagements were more likely to be the chosen MNO entry mode in cases where (1) country risk and (2) intensity of competition were low, and (3) cultural differences and (4) mobile market growth potential were high. Data also indicate that new (joint) venture entry was more likely in situations where (1) mobile market growth potential was high and (2) intensity of competition and (3) country risk were low. New ventures were also the preferred entry mode, when the MNO took a higher entry rank (i.e., occupied a follower position) and reported above average return on sales around the time of the entry decision announcement.
Taken together, the present binary logistic regression results point in the same direction as results obtained for some of the study variables in several earlier cross-industry entry mode studies, which also referred to these characteristics as transaction cost proxies.
However, a number of variables did not contribute as expected to the explanation of entry mode decisions. A first reason for this mixed research balance may be that industry specific circumstances -some of which were also mentioned here -strongly affect entry mode choices and that additional conceptual bases (e.g., real options or industrial economics reasoning or agency and hubris theory) lead to conflicting predictions.
A second reason may be that the measures of transaction-related characteristics which scholars assume to shape transaction cost differences of various foreign entry modes are too crude. For instance, the recourse to national cultural distance variables based on Hofstede's (2001) seminal work is wide-spread in international management research.
Nevertheless, this research practice ignores strong conceptual and methodological arguments put forward for quite a while against Hofstede's operational definitions of national culture dimensions and their merger into composite cultural distance measures (Bond, 2002; Harzing 2004; McSweeney, 2002; Shenkar, 2001) . 6 Other cultural indicators may be more suitable to capture transaction costs related to entry mode strategies.
Two major conclusions for management practitioners and future research can be drawn from this study. First, when faced with the question of predicting competitor's strategic 6 As an alternative, albeit also crude measure of cultural differences, the deviation of official language in home and host countries was tested as a predictor of MNO entry mode choices with the present data set. This second indicator of cultural distance led to the same conclusions that we reached based on the Hofstede index measure, thus increasing the face validity of our findings. moves, MNO managers should read characteristics of potential target countries carefully to gain a better understanding of rivals' actions and to position themselves accordingly. MNO managers must include transaction costs associated with finding, negotiating, and implementing a foreign entry opportunity in their investment appraisal.
This should be comprehensive in the sense that it includes the MNO headquarter's view both on the effort related to entering and to operating in a foreign market.
Second 
